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‘Figures of Socrates’ include Kahn’s piece; a piece by J.-F. Mattéi on ‘Socrates the
Stranger’ as an ontological µgure, related to the origin and nature of philosophy; a
compelling article by M.-C. Bataillard showing the failure of Aristotle as a historical
source for Socrates, as his Socrates, throughout the Metaphysics and especially the
three ethical works, is none other than the author of the (erroneous) thesis that virtue
is knowledge; and a piece by M. Gourinat on Karl Popper’s Socrates.
The nine essays on the Socratics open with three pieces supposedly addressing the
transition from Socrates to his followers (although this is an issue that characterizes
every occasion on which Socrates entered written literature). C. Natali gives an
interesting reading of the Socrates in Xenophon’s Oikonomikos. Giannantoni looks at
Alcibiades as a positive example of the converted Socratic pupil in Aeschines and
other Socratic literature. R. Muller proposes that Socrates and his followers are
crucial players in the evolution of western concept of freedom, and that amid a
rhetoric of ‘negative freedom’ (after I. Berlin), we see a positive freedom for virtue,
which itself remains ill-deµned. The section on Antisthenes includes Romeyer
Dherbey on the Ajax and Odysseus as opposing views of warfare and A. Brancacci
and M. Balmès on the tortuous questions of Antisthenes’ logic in, respectively,
Socrates’ dream in Plato’s Theaetetus 210c–202c and Aristotle’s Metaphysics H.3. In a
µnal set of essays on the schools, S. Husson compares Diogenes’ Politeia to that of
Plato, A. Boutot asserts the importance of the Megarians for Heidegger’s reading of
Aristotle, and Brunschwig reassesses Cyrenaic epistemology.
University of Colorado, Boulder

S. H. PRINCE
doi:10.1093/clrevj/bni236

RETHINKING THE ELENCHUS
G. A. S  (ed.): Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the
Elenchus in Plato’s Dialogues and Beyond. Pp. xiii + 327. University
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. Cased,
US$45. ISBN: 0-271-02173-X.
In his famous paper on Socratic method, ‘The Socratic Elenchus’ (Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy I [1983], pp. 27–58, reprinted with revisions in G. Vlastos,
Socratic Studies [Cambridge, 1994], pp. 1–37), Vlastos claimed that although
Socrates was himself exclusively a moralist and therefore not re·ective or
self-conscious about methodology and its terminology, there was nevertheless a
logical structure common to many important arguments in the early Socratic
dialogues. The interlocutor asserts a thesis, p. Socrates shows the interlocutor that he
is also committed to other views, q, r, which are inconsistent with p. Socrates and his
interlocutor conclude that p is therefore false. Vlastos claimed to be not merely
describing the structure of Socratic method, but also revealing a rather serious threat
that lurks within it. How can Socrates possibly claim to have proved that p is false,
when all he has actually done is show that p and q are inconsistent? The interlocutor,
had he been a little more shrewd, might have gone on to deny q, leaving p unscathed.
What we must see is that this is not a narrowly logical or methodological problem,
but one that cuts to the core of any Classicist’s or philosopher’s attempt to understand
Socrates in Plato’s early dialogues. At stake here is nothing less than the question of
whether there is a viable constructive side to Socratic philosophy. Does Socrates
merely show that his interlocutors are inconsistent, or does he draw conclusions that
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he a¸rms are true and basic for moral reform? Construed less charitably, does
Socrates mislead us into thinking that he has made some progress in defending moral
positions, when all he has really done is catch his hapless interlocutors in logical
inconsistencies that do not in themselves point toward a particular conclusion?
There can be no doubt that Vlastos called our attention to a problem of
fundamental importance to Socratic philosophy. He also formulated an intriguing
solution, which o¶ers an explanation for how Socrates’ conclusions can be justiµed.
Both his formulation of the problem and his solution have sparked a history of
controversy, the results of which are, in this reader’s mind at least, not quite so
inconclusive as the introduction to our current volume would suggest. Does Socrates
Have a Method? aims to ‘reorient the discussion of the multifarious strategies and
tactics employed by Socrates in Plato’s dialogues and to spawn new scholarly research
into previously neglected aspects of the topic’ (p. 6). Viewing Vlastos as emblematic
of the ‘analytic’ approach to philosophy, many (but not all) contributors to this
volume fault his focus on the logic of arguments at the expense of what they take to be
larger concerns. Although the authors in this collection do not in general do justice to
the philosophical signiµcance of Vlastos’ contribution, they do ask new questions,
and the answers they provide, if they do not in the end supersede or even fully address
the most intriguing puzzles Vlastos raised, broaden the discussion in welcome ways.
The volume is divided into four sections, each containing three essays followed by a
response written by someone taking a contrasting interpretive approach.
The authors in the µrst part take an historical and philological view of Socratic
method and methodological terminology. Both Lesher and Ausland argue that
Socratic method inherits earlier traditions of literary and philosophical methodology
(Parmenides’ use of elenchos in fr. 7 and traditional rhetorical topoi in forensic
contexts, respectively). These comparisons illuminate the literary and rhetorical
signiµcance of Socratic method, and I would suggest that they also summon us back
to the poets and to elements we may now see as nascent structures of philosophical
argumentation within the early poetic tradition. Although Charles Young (in his
critical response) raises some shrewd objections, H. Tarrant’s important piece on
Plato’s use of elenchos and exetasis seriously questions the entrenched assumption
that elenchos is the term that best describes Socratic interrogation.
A focus on logic and the speciµcs of Vlastos’s position generates some provocative
essays in the book’s second section. An article authored jointly by M. Carpenter and
R. Polansky, together with Brickhouse and Smith’s critical comments, challenges the
notion of a unique Socratic method by undermining the attempt to provide a univocal
account of the Socratic elenchus (although it should be noted that Vlastos never
claimed there was a single form of Socratic argument, only that many important
arguments were formulated in the pattern he described). In his ‘Elenctic Interpretation and the Delphic Oracle’, M. McPherran makes some headway into the
philosophical issues at stake by suggesting an alternative to Vlastos’ explanation for
how the elenchus generates truth. Brickhouse and Smith’s conclusion to this section, a
spirited, democratic attempt to see Socrates as ‘only like us’, misguidedly infers from
the (questionable) assumption that Socrates’ method was not unique, that it does not,
and does not claim to, generate reliable truths.
Authors in the third and fourth sections turn to an eclectic selection of dialogues to
discuss the nature of Socratic argumentation. A polemical relationship between
‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ styles of interpretation surfaces throughout, and the
debate in these sections boils down to the contrast between ‘dogmatic’ and
‘non-dogmatic’ readings of Plato. This general controversy has particular relevance
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for our basic question of whether Socratic method is constructive philosophically.
Representing the ‘continental’ approach, Gonzalez uses the (possibly spurious)
Clitophon and the Euthydemus to argue that Socratic method is ‘essentially
protreptic’, while in a discussion of the Lysis, Renaud suggests that, along with its
logical function, the elenchus aims to humble the individual. Heavily in·uenced by
the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, P. Christopher Smith argues that the Philebus’ real
theme is philosophical method. Gerson’s comments on all three essays raise salient
objections on behalf of a standard developmentalist view of the Platonic dialogues.
Like the essays in the third section, three pieces on the Charmides (by Schmid,
Press, and Carhvalho, followed by a critical response by Waugh) suggest that Socratic
method is not constructive of moral doctrine in the way that Vlastos claimed.
Carvalho could be said to speak for all three when he concludes that ‘the formation of
[a] virtuous character, not the formation of a positive moral doctrine, is the
constructive e¶ect of the Socratic method’ (p. 267). It seems to me that our authors
stand in danger of drawing a false distinction, and of misunderstanding the nature of
Vlastos’s position. Vlastos took Socrates to be attempting to prove moral truths, but
this search for moral truths is compatible with an attempt to reform his interlocutors’
character. Why must examining his interlocutor’s moral beliefs and making some
progress toward constructing a moral view exclude Socrates’ reforming their
character? Moreover, if we are to do full justice to the repeated suggestion in Plato’s
early dialogues that the arguments give Socrates, and not only his interlocutor, good
reason to accept the conclusions and act on them, we may do well to take seriously the
suggestion that Vlastos’s work has demonstrated the current philosophic signiµcance
of the Socratic elenchus as ‘our best hope for moral justiµcation in an imperfect
world’ (M. Nussbaum, Journal of Philosophy XCIV [1997], p. 37).
Swarthmore College

GRACE M. LEDBETTER
doi:10.1093/clrevj/bni237

CRATYLUS
D. S    : Plato’s Cratylus. Pp. xii + 190. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003. Cased, £40, US$60. ISBN: 0-521-58492-2.
Sedley begins by posing a question—‘Why did Plato write dialogues?’—and
suggesting an answer: because of a growing belief that conversation, in the form of
question and answer, is the structure of thought. Philosophical questioning and
answering may take place internally, in a single individual’s mind, or in conversation
between individuals; Platonic question-and-answer sequences may be taken as
dramatizations of Plato’s own thinking. S.’s reading of the Cratylus illustrates this
view of Platonic dialectic in detail. More particularly, S. shows how the Cratylus may
be taken to dramatize Plato’s sorting out mentally the two major components in his
intellectual make-up: the views of Cratylus, the µrst major in·uence on Plato, and
those of Socrates.
S. also asks himself where the Cratylus µts into the overall chronology of Plato’s
career, answering ‘not in any one place’ (p. 7). S. places the ‘hard core of the dialogue
as we have it’ (p. 14) not later than the middle of Plato’s middle period, but argues that
there are traces of later revision, perhaps from about the time of composition of the
Sophist. Except for two passages which S. considers to belong properly to the original
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